Information Warfare Is Crucial in Combating Terrorism

The fight against international terrorism is not just one that is to be carried on the battlefield, a new study conducted by Israeli researchers says. Rather, information warfare is at the forefront of the struggle, as the support or critics of the general population, in any country, can be won or lost very easily through TV shows, newspapers, or the Internet. The security experts warn that the Western world, as well as Israel, are currently on the defensive with this section of the war, and that they must even out the odds, or move to the offensive, if the counter-attacks are to be successful.

The new paper has been published in the National Security College's journal, Bitachon Leumi, and has been authored by University of Haifa Ezri Center for the Study of Iran and the Gulf researcher Dr. Yaniv Levyatan. He argues that information is oftentimes even more important when dealing with terrorist groups than conventional weapons and open confrontations.

“The terrorist organizations invest efforts in information warfare tools, which enables them to bridge the physical gap between them and their conventional fighting forces. Today, these organizations frequently hold an advantageous stance in this field,” the expert says.

“There is a major difference between gathering intelligence for military fighting and gathering intelligence for information warfare. Intelligence for information warfare must relate to components such as who the enemy's elitists are, what their social structure is, and what their political and tribal affiliations are. It is important to know what symbols are significant to the opponents, what the population's primary information channels are, and which messages would be engaged or discarded,” the study also reads.

“Information is a weapon, and just like an army invests in tanks and planes, the army must also invest in information weapons. The army must develop abilities and skills that are not always considered as an intrinsic part of its activities – such as computer games, culture products, video clips, and television programs. When the army succeeds in presenting a product of information that incriminates the guerrilla organization, it might be able to meet its required target more efficiently than if it had acted with physical force,” Levyatan concludes.